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Answers to the first two questions remain elusive. A seminal model of lobbying, Grossman and Helpman (1994) , treats lobbying as the transfer of resources from lobbyists to politicians, but these transfers could equally be interpreted as campaign contributions or even as bribes. Indeed, Coate and Morris (1999) or Yalcin and Damania (2005) are but two examples of the latter interpretation.
1 Further, even when theoretical models explicitly assume that donations from interest groups are going to be used as campaign contributions, as in Baron (1994) or Grossman and Helpman (1996) , what is it that makes this lobbying and not corruption? Empirical work in both political science and economics seems to be more aware of the issue but it tends to distinguish the two phenomena solely on the basis of the 1 See Mitchell and Munger (1991) , Austen-Smith (1997) , Drazen (2000) , , Grossman and Helpman (2001) , Lowery and Gray (2004) for surveys of the extensive theoretical work on lobbying. As mentioned, the differences between lobbying and corruption have received little attention in the theoretical literature but two exceptions are Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) and Dahm and Porteiro (2006) , who compare the choice of lobbying with monetary payments or bribing to the choice of strategic provision of information to politicians.
2 chosen means of influence (corruption is associated with bribes while campaign contributions or information are associated with lobbying).
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This paper takes the distinction between corruption and lobbying seriously but also challenges the view that the means used to exert influence is the main distinction between them. We suggest that a more interesting distinction has to do with who is being influenced and, as a consequence, with which political institutions are in place supporting this choice. In particular, we first define lobbying as all those practices that seek to influence policy-makers, such as politicians or regulators, while corruption is directed at influencing policy-enforcers, typically members of the bureaucracy. This is, of course, not the only way one should distinguish between lobbying and corruption, but it is an important one and one that has not been pursued far enough before. 3 We claim this way of differentiating between lobbying and corruption is fruitful because it also allows the study of the interaction between the two. Harstad and Svensson (2008) argue that if we identify corruption with the process of influencing bureaucrats and lobbying with the process of influencing politicians, the two phenomena are substitutes. This is because successful lobbying of a politician will render bribing the bureaucrat redundant.
Also, by pointing out that lobbying is a more expensive but more "permanent" form of influence, Harstad and Svensson argue that lobbying should be more prevalent at higher levels of development. Campos and Giovannoni (2007) present supporting evidence for the latter claim but fail to pin down the differentiating factors for lobbying vis-à-vis corruption.
In this paper, we try to expand upon this small, related literature in several ways. One 3 is to put together a conceptual framework which, acknowledging that the question of whether lobbying and corruption are substitutes or complements is an important one, tries to go beyond this by arguing that political institutions are crucial in governing this distinction. Here we examine three main sets of political institutions: democracy and political stability, forms of government (e.g. presidential versus parliamentary system), and electoral rules. Because existing theoretical work tends to focus on each of these institutions separately, solving for a dynamic game-theoretic equilibrium of influence behavior encompassing this full set of institutions is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we present a conceptual framework and an attendant empirical investigation of which and how political institutions affect both corruption and lobbying, drawing heavily from each one of these literatures (that is, on electoral rules, forms of government and democracy and stability). Our identification strategy combines natural experiments and structural approaches. 4 On the former, we focus on the choice of a specific set of countries, the transition economies of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, because they provide a unique natural experiment situation. All these countries started out in 1989 with equal (or as similar as we will ever encounter) levels of political and of economic development. The variation in the type and intensity of political influence in early 1989 across these countries is minimal and the same can be said of their economic liberalization (Campos and Coricelli, 2002) . Since 1989, they have followed radically different economic and political trajectories which generate the variation we here also exploit for identification. Finally, in addition to examining whether or not lobbying and corruption differ and, if so, which and how political institutions are crucial in this differentiation, we 4 For example, our estimates of the impact electoral rules on corruption were obtained using the theoretical model and econometric specification proposed in , and we tried to follow a similar approach for forms of government and democracy and stability. Yet, notice that in the case of , the theory concerns the effects of electoral rules on corruption, not on lobbying. We thus treat lobbying and corruption as means of influence and potentially governed by a similar set of determinants. We expand on this issue in section 3 below.
4 also study their differential impacts in terms of both political and economic pay-offs. We investigate the relative importance of lobbying and corruption vis-à-vis the production of political influence as well as vis-à-vis enterprise performance. We are unaware of similar exercises being carried out so far.
Using 2002 survey data for about 6000 firms in 26 countries, our results suggest that lobbying and corruption are indeed fundamentally different and that political institutions play a central role in explaining these differences. We find that the enterprises that are more likely to engage in lobbying are those that are older, larger, and foreign-owned. Taking these characteristics into account, we also find that firms that favor lobbying tend to be in countries that are less politically unstable, more democratic, with a more independent media, and which have experienced more political leadership alternations. Moreover, they are also more likely to be located in federal states, with presidential systems and, within presidential systems, where the president has fewer (de jure and de facto) powers. Within parliamentary systems, lobbying seems to be more effective where there are more constraints on the executive. We also find that lobbying is more effective where the electoral system features closed lists and smaller electoral districts. Crucially, the significant determinants we find for corruption are essentially the same but with all carrying opposite signs. Finally, we also find that lobbying is a much more effective instrument for political influence than corruption and that lobbying is also a much stronger explanatory factor for firm performance than corruption, even in poorer, often perceived as highly corrupt, less developed countries.
The paper is organized as follows. In section two, we articulate the theoretical underpinnings of our empirical analysis. In section three, we describe the data and our empirical methodology while in section four we discuss our econometric results. Section five concludes.
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How Political Institutions Determine the Choice between Lobbying and Corruption
Corruption and lobbying are, at the most fundamental level, ways of influencing public officials. While these two phenomena are normally treated in political science and economics as distinct phenomena, with mostly distinct literatures, there is still confusion and uncertainty about what their differences, if any, really are.
One potential distinction is whether or not money changes hands. This distinction can be meaningful because in many cases lobbying is not about the exchange of money and favors, but it is about the provision of information (Truman, 1951) . Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) , for example, show how lobbying can be the provision of policy-relevant information to politicians. Similarly, Grossman and Helpman (1999) show how endorsements can effectively influence the policy-making process. Yet, much of the lobbying literature also focuses on the provision of monetary payments to politicians. 5 In some political systems, notably the US, these payments may be perfectly legal and considered to be lobbying, while in other political systems, the same exact payments would be considered illegal and be identified as corruption.
In this paper, we introduce a clear distinction between lobbying and corruption that focuses not on the means through which influence is gained, but on who is the target (or, to put differently, who the prevalent political institutions allow to be the target.) In particular we distinguish between the case where influence is sought with those that make rules (lobbying) and the case where it is sought with those who execute them (corruption). This distinction is pursued in a recent theoretical paper by Harstad and Svensson (2008) who emphasize that it is easier for those who make rules to commit not to reverse their decisions than it is for those who execute those rules. For example, a tax inspector who takes a bribe to look the other way 5 Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Baron (1994) are two influential examples. As noted, in these cases lobbying takes the form of monetary payments that are interpreted as campaign contributions but the payments could equally be interpreted as bribes.
6 cannot credibly commit not to ask for another bribe at the next available opportunity while politicians or regulators who are persuaded to change the tax rules would find it more difficult to reverse their decisions and so can assure the lobbyist that their decisions are likely to last for some time. Harstad and Svensson's model shows that since lobbying is more reliable but also more expensive than corruption, firms with lower capital levels will be more likely to rely on the latter. The other side of their argument is that, as firms grow and accumulate capital, bureaucrats will be able to ask for larger bribes, as the stakes for firms increase. At some point, the cost of corruption will be so high that firms will switch to lobbying. This process has several consequences which provide testable empirical predictions, some of which we tackle in this paper. The first is that as capital intensity in a given political system increases, lobbying tends to replace corruption. A second is that since rule makers in more stable systems will find it easier to commit to policies, lobbying should be relatively more successful in politically stable systems. We discuss these below in detail. on the other hand, the distinction between lobbying and corruption is based on the level at which either phenomenon occurs, then, conditional on whether corruption and lobbying are substitutes or complements, one can make predictions on the impact of certain features of political institutions on corruption if one can make predictions on the impact on lobbying.
More specifically, given that the theory in Harstad and Svensson (2008) and the evidence in Campos and Giovannoni (2007) clear that these arguments tend to have more relevance for lobbying rather than corruption.
Democratization is more likely to have an impact on lobbying because this is the phenomenon where the relationship between firms and politicians is direct and more sensitive to democratic institutions: bureaucrats are only very partially accountable even in the most developed democracies, while the difference between accountable and unaccountable politicians has an enormous impact on their willingness and ability to receive rents from firms.
Another democracy-related variable of interest here is whether the country has a more 9 or less independent media. Theoretical work (Besley and Prat 2006) has emphasized the effect of an independent media on the level of political corruption. Empirical work (e.g. Brunetti and Weder 2003) finds evidence of that relationship. As usual however, the countrylevel measures of corruption used so far do not capture the distinction between lobbying and corruption proposed in our paper. In light of this distinction, we expect an independent media to have a stronger negative effect on lobbying than on corruption.
Political Alternation
It is clear that many of the issues that apply to the interaction between democratization and lobbying/corruption also apply to the notion of the stability of the political system itself (Olson, 1965) . There is, however, a separate notion of political stability and that has to do with how much alternation there is in the system. As pointed out above with reference to the Harstad and Svensson (2008) framework, lobbying gains effectiveness whenever there is less alternation because then legislative commitments taken by ruling politicians are more reliable. Della Porta (2004) makes the point that in a system where party identification amongst voters is low, political corruption will tend to be higher. If we put these two observations together, we might identify two opposing effects: a political system where ideologies don't matter very much is inherently more favorable to lobbying, but if we assume (as is natural to do) that weak ideologies will lead to frequent change in personnel, this will lead to less lobbying, not more and which of these effects will dominate is an issue for empirical analysis to resolve.
Political Institutions -Form of Government
The main focus of our analysis in this paper is, in the tradition of the political economy literature, on political institutions. We divide these into three categories: forms of government, electoral rules and the degree of federalism/centralization.
There is a certain amount of theoretical work on the impact of specific forms of government on lobbying. Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002) argue that systems where there is no vote of confidence procedure (congressional systems), are more amenable to lobbying because in such political systems coalitions are often made on an ad-hoc basis depending on the policy in question and lobbying might be useful because it provides information about the benefits and costs a certain policy provides to different districts. This makes it easier for the policy supporters to set up a coalition. In a parliamentary system, where there is a confidence procedure, it is much more difficult to set up ad-hoc coalitions for different pieces of legislation and so the information that lobbies may provide is less useful. Helpman and
Persson (2001) study how the internal organization of parliaments affects lobbying efforts.
They argue that in (US-style) congressional systems, policies tend to be more unevenly distributed than in parliamentary systems and that lobbying reinforces this effect. To the extent that one can imagine lobbyists to be more likely to be the winners in the process of legislative bargaining, one can conjecture that congressional systems provide more incentives for lobbying.
Kunikova (2006) and Tabellini (1997 and 2000) both address the impact of an independent executive (a president) on lobbying. 10 The former argues that presidents are not accountable to a coalition because they cannot be removed by the legislature and because the legislature also need their cooperation in terms of the policy making process. Therefore, presidents can find it relatively easy to pursue rent-seeking activities. On the other hand, Persson, Roland and Tabellini argue that checks and balances reduce the opportunities for lobbyists to seek special favors because a system of checks and balances i) makes it clear to voters who is accountable for policy-making decisions and ii) provides a process whereby it is more difficult for different politicians to collude at the general public's expense.
Political Institutions -Electoral Rules
Another major institutional component that has been explored is the role of the electoral system. There is a substantial literature where the main mechanism through which electoral systems affect lobbying opportunities is that of political accountability. Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) argue that decreasing district magnitude is associated with more lobbying because as district magnitude decreases, fewer and fewer parties can hope to challenge. This gives voters less choice and makes it harder to hold politicians accountable. At the same time,
closed-party lists (where voters don't have a direct choice of candidates and can only vote for a given party) also reduce accountability and make lobbying relatively more effective.
Kunicova and Rose-Ackermann (2005) agree that closed-party lists are inherently more amenable to lobbying but also argue that in majoritarian systems, politics is more adversarial and less consensual because of the small number of parties and so monitoring of one side by another is stronger. In other words, in majoritarian systems we are less likely to see parties covering each other's backs and thus we should observe more accountability. Moreover, the large number of parties reduces accountability because it also makes it more difficult to attribute responsibility to specific parties or politicians. So, we should expect an unambiguously positive effect of closed lists on lobbying while for the effect of higher district magnitude (which correlates highly with proportionality) we should expect a negative effect on lobbying if the effect highlighted by dominates and a positive effect if the effect highlighted by Kunicova and Rose-Ackermann (2005) dominates.
Political Institutions -Federalism
A third major institutional characteristic is the level of (de)centralization in a given country.
The recent literature, both theoretical and empirical, has so far produced contrasting results in analyzing the relationship between federalism on the one hand, and lobbying and corruption on the other. Once again, one of the main problems has been that the literature has not taken on board the distinction between something that has a strong relationship with political institutions and something for which this relationship is weaker as the counterparts are bureaucrats, not politicians. This is particularly important here because some of the factors that have been put forward in discussing the relationship between federalism and lobbying or corruption, critically depend on this distinction. So, for example, one could argue that decentralization has a negative impact because it reduces the quality of bureaucrats while one could also argue that yardstick competition between different local entities has a positive impact. 11 Clearly, the first theory is more relevant to what we have defined as corruption, which would be likely to increase while the second theory would be more relevant to our notion of lobbying because politicians are more vulnerable than bureaucrats to pressure from voters if their locality is underperforming. Thus, we would expect that the potential effectiveness of lobbying to be reduced. Further, a decentralized system should make lobbying more difficult because a politician's ability to commit to certain policies is more limited when others (up and down in the hierarchy) can change things.
Firm Characteristics, Influence and Firm Outcomes
The analysis will also consider several variables that have to do with the specific characteristics of the enterprises in our sample. These are firm size, age, whether they are privately owned and whether they are foreign owned. With respect to firm size and age, two possible conjectures emerge. On the one hand, smaller and younger, less established firms, should be more likely to rely on corruption because they don't have the resources or have not had time to establish connections with the political establishment. On the other hand, one can 11 A strand of the literature has identified the opposite effect on this very point. When there is great heterogeneity between different local entities, the less productive regions will lose investments and will focus on predation (Cai and Treisman 2005) or, different regions might compete by guaranteeing firms protection from the federal government (Cai and Treisman 2004) .
13 also conjecture that it is precisely due to these drawbacks that these firms should be more likely to join a lobby group which would compensate for this. Either way, this stresses that controlling for such characteristics is essential. We also expect privately and foreign owned firms to rely less on corruption and more on lobbying.
Having discussed how different political institutions and firm characteristics affect the decision to lobby or corrupt bureaucratic officials, we also need to ask ourselves how effective these two instruments might be. In particular, which of these is more effective in obtaining political influence? Secondly, what effects do they have on firm performance? The answer to the first question should be straightforward as we have argued that lobbying is a more reliable albeit more expensive way of attempting to influence politicians. Therefore, we would expect this to be the case in our empirical. The answer to the second question is less obvious. Presumably, firms decide to use lobbying or corruption in order to improve their profitability but it is also possible that they might feel forced to do that by an institutional and economic environment that is not favorable to them. In addition, firms might be victims of a bad equilibrium where lobbying and/or corruption are so endemic that they become necessary just to keep up with competitors. Our empirical strategy will be to try to isolate the effect to see whether these influence seeking methods have a net positive or negative effect on firm performance.
Data and Methodology
In this section, we describe the main features of the data set and of the econometric methodology we use to test the hypotheses outlined above. Our main data source is the In order to ensure representativeness, statistical offices in each country were contacted and the total number of firms by industry and number of employees were obtained.
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Information was also collected from the statistical offices on the share of each industrial sector in Gross Domestic Product so that, for each country, the composition of the firms in the sample reflects differences in the relative shares of each sector in GDP as well as their firm size distribution.
Central to our analysis is the data on lobby membership and corruption. On the former, firms were asked whether or not they were a member of a trade association at the time of the interview. 14 A positive answer was coded "1," while the value of zero was given to a negative answer. On average, about a third of the firms in our sample said they were members of a lobby group. The relatively large standard deviation indicates that these figures may vary considerably across countries. Indeed, they range from a low of 9 percent (of the firms being lobby members) in Belarus to 96 percent of Slovenian firms answering they were members at the time of the interview. 15 If we correlate lobbying membership with the level of per capita GDP (the source for the latter is the Penn World Tables 6.2 and the data refers to the log of per capita GDP at purchasing power parity for the year of the survey, 2002) we find there is a positive correlation between lobby membership and per capita GDP, but also that this correlation is not particularly high, at around 0.12. It is worthwhile mentioning that if, using the BEEPS 1999 data discussed in Campos and Giovannoni (2007), we compare levels of lobby membership in 1999 to those in 2002 we find that it seems to be rising in these economies. Moreover, this is happening while these countries post positive and high GDP growth rates and, as noted by the EBRD (2006), decreasing levels of corruption.
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Because the firm identifiers are not provided it is not possible to link these two data sets and assess these trends in full at this moment, but it is clear to us that future research will do well in trying to understand these largely untapped and potentially important trends.
The measure of corruption we use captures firms' experience with corruption in each country. The reason for focusing on this type of measure, despite the availability of various for lobbying in the empirical cross-country literature (Potters and Sloof, 1996 .) It is a deficiency that information on lobbying is restricted to firm membership, and does not include, inter alia, values of membership fees, whether it is voluntary, the matter of political campaign contributions, etc. Given that this is an issue shared by the empirical literature on lobbying, future research would do well in studying these aspects.
well-know aggregate macro measures (such as those from Transparency International), is because recent consensus among researchers in this area favors the former (Svensson, 2005) . The cut-off value of 10% is admittedly arbitrary. In its defense, we offer that this threshold was chosen for this categorical variable as a rough estimate of expected rates of return to investment in the "average sector in the average country": if firms have to pay such a high percentage of revenues in unofficial payments to public officials it may be difficult for them to break-even. With this concern in mind, we have re-coded this variable by lowering as well as by increasing this threshold and we have also tried using dummy variables for each category (of percentage of revenue) but none of these affect qualitatively the results reported in the next section. different with our measures of corruption and lobbying is that the simple correlation between these two measures is extremely low (at -0.047). Also of interest, is that the correlation between corruption and the level of per capita GDP is negative but not particularly high, at -0.11.
Our central hypothesis is that lobbying and corruption are fundamentally different: we have argued above that differences in political institutions significantly affect the choice firms make between lobbying and corruption. Recognizing that 'political institutions' is a multi-faceted concept, we collected data on a number of its key dimensions. More specifically, and as explained in section 2 above, we divide potential determinants in three groups: democracy and stability, forms of government and electoral rules.
In terms of democracy and stability, we collected data for how democratic is the political process (coded from a maximum of 1 for "democratic" to a minimum of 7 for "totally not democratic") as well as for the degree of media independence (coded from a maximum of 1 for "free media" to a minimum of 7 for "totally not free media"). 18 From the same source, we have used an aggregate indicator of democratization (which actually is an average of ratings for political process, civil society, independent media, and governance.)
We are also interested in understanding the role of political instability on the probability of an individual firm being a member of a lobby group and of using corrupt practices. 19 In order to capture political instability, we use a similar approach to the one for corruption in that we favor firm-based measures. They are also from the BEEPS 2002 data base and refer to the "number of working days lost due to strikes or other labor disputes" and "number of working 18 Independent Media and Political Process are both from Freedom House's Nations in Transit, 2003. They are measure in a 1 to 7 continuous scale; where 1 represent the highest levels of media independence. Political process reflects national executive and legislative elections, the development of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process.
days lost due to civil unrest." The pair-wise correlations involving these variables, with respect to lobbying and corruption, are all very small and never above .05. In addition, we have also used a measure that reflects the degree of alternation of leaders (from Hoff, Horowitz and Milanovic, 2005) . The cumulative number of changes in leadership is up to the date of the survey, that is, until 2002, and is measured as follows: "In democratic political systems (whether presidential or parliamentary), a leadership change is counted when control of all veto-wielding legislative houses changes. In presidential democratic systems-where presidents have either decree powers or veto power that can be overridden only by legislative supermajorities-the president, too, must change. A change in the leadership of some but not all of the relevant veto-wielding institutions is not counted" (Hoff et al. 2005 ).
Our variables for forms of government encompass whether or not the country is a federal state (coded 1 if federal, zero otherwise), a categorization of the political system (coded 1 for parliamentary, 2 for semi-parliamentary dominated by parliament, 3 for semiparliamentary dominated by the president, and 4 for presidential), and for an index of the de jure presidential power (Presidential Power Index). The source of these variables is Armingeon and Careja (2004) . We also use a dummy variable for whether or not the country has a parliamentary system (from Keefer, 2005) , as well as data for presidential veto powers 20 (from Tsebelis and Rizova, 2006) and executive constraints (from Polity IV). The Presidential Power Index reflects the extent of de jure powers stipulated by the national constitution. Armingeon and Careja (2004) identify 29 different powers (e.g., to dissolve the parliament, to call referendum, to call elections) and examine the text of national constitutions to assess whether or not, and the extent to which, the executive actually holds these powers. 'Executive constraints' is our de facto measure of executive powers (it is 20 The index of president veto power is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the answer is yes to "Can the president amend vetoed legislation?" and zero otherwise. It is thus an indicator of a de jure presidential power (albeit rather specific and from a more specialized source).
defined in Polity IV as a measure of "operational (de facto) independence of chief executive.") It uses a 1 to 7 scale, with 1 indicating unlimited executive authority and 7 indicating executive parity or subordination. This last measured has been used widely in comparative research (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001 ). We are interested in both the way lobbying and corruption translates into political influence as well as how they affect firm performance. Our measures of influence reflect firms' perceptions in terms of whether it has influenced the content of laws and regulations affecting its operation. The source is again the 2002 BEEPS data base. Our measure is a binary variable coded 1 if the firm answered "yes", and zero if it answered "no." We find that 24 percent of the firms answer yes to this question on influence, with the relatively large standard deviation suggesting large cross-country variation: from 14 percent in the Czech
Republic to 54 percent in Albania. The pair-wise correlations between corruption and lobbying, on the one hand, and influence, on the other, are also not high, being around -0.04
for the former and about 0.27 for the latter. (3) where Performance ic is a continuous variable reflecting the rate of growth of sales in real terms between 1999 and 2002 of firm i (in country c); lobbying ic is the binary variable defined above; corrupton ic is our measure of corruption (which can be country-level or alternatively firm-based); and W ic is a vector of auxiliary control variables (including per capita GDP, firm ownership, headquarters location and measures of political instability).
In these latter models (influence and firm performance) we are naturally concerned about the potential endogeneity of lobby membership and corruption. The issue regards the possibility that (at least) one of the explanatory variables (i.e., corruption or lobbying) in the influence (or performance) equation is endogenous. Firms may be more likely to join lobby groups if and when such groups are perceived to be influential or if they learn that lobbying delivers large benefits in terms of performance. By the same token, firms may be more likely to bribe if, ceteris paribus, they expect this to give them more clout, with better performance also a possible expression of this increased influence. It is therefore important to address the possibility that our probit estimates might be inconsistent. In order to take this issue into account, we apply the Instrumental Variables estimator. Below we estimate the influence equation (equation 2 above) and the performance equation (equation 3 above) treating corruption and/or lobbying as an endogenous variable. We carry this out using equation (1) as the baseline first-stage regression and check whether the results are robust to changes in the instrument set.
Econometric Results
In this section we present and discuss our econometric results in three stages: firstly, we investigate whether political institutions do indeed affect lobbying and corruption according to the hypotheses we spell out above and whether they affect lobbying and corruption differently in a significant way (Tables 1 to 5 ). Secondly, we study how lobbying and corruption generate political influence and whether one of these two is more effective in doing so (Tables 6 and 7) . Thirdly, we study how lobbying and corruption affect firm performance and whether one of the two is more powerful in so doing (Tables 8 and 9 ).
Tables 1 to 5 report our results for the various determinants of lobbying and corruption. There are two sets of general findings worth highlighting. One is that corruption never turns out to be an important determinant of lobbying, and vice-versa, the choice of lobbying never seems to be an important determinant of corruption. A second set of findings refer to the controls we use: we find evidence that older, larger and foreign firms are systematically associated with lobbying, while (independently) younger, smaller and 24 domestic firms are systematically associated with corruption. Interestingly, once these factors are taken into account, there is no systematic pattern with respect to per capita GDP. That is, per capita income can show a positive or a negative effect on corruption and/or on lobbying conditional on different sets of political institutions. The next question is, then, which and how political institutions affect corruption and lobbying.
The role of democracy and political instability as determinants of lobbying and corruptions are examined in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively. It is nothing short of remarkable how contrasting these two sets of results are. On the one hand, we find that lobbying is more likely in more democratic countries, where the media is more independent and in contexts in which the overall political process is more democratic. Recall that the variable political process refers specifically to the transparency of national executive and legislative elections, the development of multiparty systems, and the extent and intensity of popular participation in the political process. Although this factor (and an independent media) are obviously part of the overall democracy variable, as explained above we are interested in checking how instrumental these individual components turn out to be in differentiating between lobbying and corruption. Table 2 shows that democracy, independent media and political process are negatively and significantly associated with corruption, in exact contrast to the same results for lobbying. Also we find that political instability does not seem to exert a significant effect on the decision to lobby (we report a firm-based measure reflecting days of work lost due to worker strikes), while we find that instability is a somewhat important driver of corruption:
firms that experience a large number of days of work lost due to strikes tend to pay a high share of their annual revenues in bribes. In short, political instability breeds corruption, but it does not seem to breed lobbying.
Of course, political instability does not need to be violent, organized or of a localized nature. As explained in detail in the previous section, we believe that alternation of political groups in power is an equally important aspect that may have important consequences in terms of the choices firms make between bribing and lobbying. In line with our previous discussion about the roles of rule-makers and rule-enforcers, we find that political alternation is detrimental to lobbying efforts yet beneficial for firms that favor corruption as a means of exerting political influence.
Forms of government are another potentially important determinant of the choices firms make in terms of lobbying and corruption. We present these results in Tables 3 and 4. We again find a remarkable degree of contrast between the two sets of results. We find evidence that lobbying blossoms in contexts in which the executive has more limited formal powers, less veto powers and more binding de facto constraints (Table 3) . By the same token, we can see that corruption tends to increase in contexts in which the executive has less limited formal powers, more veto powers and less binding de facto constraints (Table 4) . We also find evidence that federal or decentralized states are less conducive to corruption and more conducive to lobbying. When we use a rough measure of whether or not the political system is mostly parliamentary, we find somewhat surprisingly that this is associated with less lobbying and with more corruption. However, a finer depiction of this key feature of the political institutional framework reveals that actually lobbying thrives in pure parliamentary and pure presidential systems and that it weakens both in semi-parliamentary and semipresidential systems. Interestingly, we obtain exactly the opposite result for corruption: the latter increases in the two mixed systems and decreases in the two pure cases (pure parliamentary and pure presidential system.) We think this result offers a new and interesting way to approach the discussion on the possible non-linearity of the effects of political institutions on the choice between lobbying and corruption, discussed in section 2 above. Table 5 shows our results for another set of political institutions that inspired much recent research, namely electoral rules. Both PINDP and the "Closed List" results seem to confirm the prediction that closed lists reduce accountability for politicians and thus are more conducive to lobbying. The result for corruption, however, does little to reinforce the pattern we have found so far (driven by substitutability) in which the coefficients for lobbying and corruption tend to go in opposite directions. For district magnitude, the results seem to be in line with Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) which emphasizes the positive effect of district size on reducing lobbying.
In sum, the results in Tables 1 to 5 show that: (a) lobbying and corruption are very different according to the views expressed by our large and representative sample of firms in 26 countries; (b) some firm characteristics are important to understand their differences, in particular, older, larger and foreign firms are systematically more likely to engage in lobbying while their younger, smaller and domestic counterparts are systematically more likely to engage in corruption; (c) once these firm characteristics are taken into account, there is little support for a consistent effect of the level of per capita GDP in determining lobbying and corruption choices; and (d) political institutions, however, seem instrumental in explaining these differences: firms that are more likely to engage in lobbying are those located in federal states, with presidential systems and, within presidential systems, where the president has fewer (de jure and de facto) powers. Within parliamentary systems, lobbying is more effective where there are more constraints on the executive. Finally, we find that lobbying is also more effective where the electoral system features closed lists and has smaller districts. Crucially, the significant determinants we find for corruption are the same, with the extremely few exceptions noted above, but carry the exact opposite signs. It is on this basis that we claim that corruption and lobbying should be better understood as substitutes.
Once this relationship between lobbying and corruption is established, the natural question that follows is whether any one of them is systematically more powerful or effective 27 in terms of political as well as of economic performance. Table 6 examines their relative importance in terms of the production of political influence and indeed the main finding is that firms in our sample systematically point to lobbying as the most effective way of exerting political influence. As the table shows, the coefficient on corruption is never significant and, in a few cases, even suggests that corrupt firms are less influential, lending some further support to the notion of substitutability between the two. Taking the specification in column 6, and evaluating at the mean, the fact that the firm is a lobbying member increases the probability of a firm perceiving itself as influential by around 19.4%.
In terms of firm characteristics, the results are also reassuring: we find that older and larger firms tend to see themselves as more influential, while foreigners and those located in richer countries do not necessarily do. In terms of various political institutions, we note that firms in parliamentary systems, in federal states, and where the executive enjoys a larger range of de jure powers, also tend to perceive themselves as more influential.
One major concern regarding these results is that lobbying, corruption and influence are jointly determined. Table 7 tries to address such concerns by jointly estimating our influence and corruption equations (column 1), by jointly estimating our influence and lobbying equations (column 2), and in the remaining columns, by jointly estimating our influence, lobbying and corruption equations. As it is clear from the table, using Instrumental Variables Probit does little to affect our main result that lobbying is a much more effective mean of producing political influence than corruption. Moreover, this conclusion is not only robust to whether we model only corruption as endogenous, only lobbying, or both, but also to changes in the instrument set in terms of which dimension we select to capture political institutions (in columns 1 to 3 we use parliamentary and days lost to strikes, while in column 4 we use mean district, in column 5 political process, in column 6 political alternation and in column 7 independent media.) The diagnostic statistics provided in Table 8 all show that in 28 no case the set of instruments could be considered invalid or irrelevant.
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So far, we established that not only lobbying and corruption are very different, but the former is much more effective in generating political pay-offs. The natural question is: but what about the economic pay-offs? In section 2 we suggested that lobbying is both the instrument of choice for more successful firms but whether the impact of lobbying or corruption is larger may be more difficult to assess. The measure of economic pay-offs or economic performance we use is the growth rate of the firm's sales in the three years before the survey interviews took place (that is, between 1999 and 2002.) Table 8 has our baseline results for the case of firm performance while in Table 9 , as before, we try to address concerns about biases introduced by the possibility that corruption, lobbying and sales growth are jointly determined. As it can be seen in Tables 8 and 9 , the main result is that lobby members grow faster. The result remains after we incorporate the aforementioned endogeneity concerns. Using column 7 from table 8, a lobby member on average, between 1999 and 2002, grew 15 percentage points faster than a non-lobbying member over the same period. Keeping in mind that the average firm grew 24% in this period, the impact of lobbying is substantial. Equally important is the result the coefficient on corruption is (again) never statistically significantly different from zero indicating that the use of bribes does not seem to matter with respect to sales growth.
We also find that younger firms systematically grow faster, but that this can not be said when considering firm size or ownership. In terms of political institutions, those firms that have grown faster, tend to be located in countries where the media is independent, but also where the executives face less de jure and de facto constraints, in presidential systems,
For the sake of completeness, we also run the following robustness exercise. If we exclude lobbying from all these specifications, the coefficient on corruption is never statistically significant. If we exclude corruption from all these specifications, the coefficient on lobbying is still always positive and statistically significant. and in countries in which the degree of centralization tend to be higher (that is, in non-federal states).
In sum, we first established that corruption and lobbying are different, and that their differences can be understood in light of deeper differences in the political institutions in which these firms operate. If they differ, the question that follows is which one is preferable for firms. In this regard, we find, present and discuss substantial and systematic evidence supporting the notion that lobbying is more robustly associated with higher political and economic pay-offs (influence and sales growth, respectively) than corruption. The fact that many of the countries in which our firms operate are often identified as some of the most corrupt places in the world stacks the cards against our hypothesis and reinforces our main findings.
Conclusions
This paper tries to clarify the economic and political determinants and roles of lobbying and corruption. In doing so we challenged a commonly held view that they differ by the means used to obtain influence, while we argue that the fundamental difference has to do with where influence is being sought. For us, lobbying is all the actions taken to obtain influence with rule-makers while corruption is all the action taken to influence rule-enforcers. We provide a conceptual framework in which we show how our distinction allows us a rich set of predictions on the relationship between these phenomena, on how they are affected by different political institutional set-up and how important they are for the success of firms.
Using 2002 survey data for almost 6000 firms in 26 developing countries, we show that political institutions play a significant role in explaining how they differ. More specifically, we divided potential determinants in three groups: democracy and stability, forms of government and electoral systems. We find that the firms that are more likely to engage in lobbying are those that are older, larger, and foreign-owned, and tend to be in countries that are less politically unstable, more democratic, with more independent media, and more leadership alternations since 1989. We also find that the firms that are more likely to engage in lobbying are those located in federal states, with presidential systems and, within presidential systems, where the president has fewer (de jure and de facto) powers. Within parliamentary systems, lobbying is more effective where there are more constraints on the executive. We find that lobbying is also more effective where the electoral system features closed lists and has smaller district magnitude. Crucially, the significant determinants we find for corruption are the same but carry the exact opposite sign, with extremely few exceptions.
On this basis, we claim that corruption and lobbying and substitutes in our sample. Further, we find confirmation that lobbying, seems to be a much more effective instrument for political influence than corruption. More surprisingly, we also find that lobbying is a much stronger explanatory factor of firm performance than corruption, and this even in poorer, less developed countries.
One main challenge for future research on these issues is that while more precise data at firm level on corruption is beginning to be available, data on lobbying at the firm level is still very sketchy. A very important issue, for example, is that with the existing data we cannot distinguish between firms who lobby directly in addition or as opposed to lobbying indirectly through a trade association or lobby group, nor can we separate trade associations from pure lobbies. Further, in the paper we have stressed the extreme importance of differentiating between lobbying and corruption with respect to their targets and not the means used. But once this crucial distinction is understood, a question does remain of how different means of lobbying can perform in specific institutional contexts. On this count, progress at both theoretical and empirical level is needed and would be extremely important. Work days lost-strikes reflects the answer from the firms in this sample to a question about how many work days were lost last year because of (legal or illegal) worker strikes (source is BEEPS 2002). Cumulative changes of ideological and political leadership are from Hoff et al (2005) and reflect the cumulative number of such changes since 1989. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Democracy, Independent Media and Political Process are measured in inverse scale (e.g., lower values indicate more democratic countries) and their common sources is Freedom House's Nations in Transit. Work days lost-strikes reflects the answer from the firms in this sample to a question about how many work days were lost last year because of (legal or illegal) worker strikes (source is BEEPS 2002). Cumulative changes of ideological and political leadership are from Hoff et al (2005) and reflect the cumulative number of such changes since 1989. {0.0000} Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Instruments, columns 1 to 3: all above plus parliamentary, and days lost to strikes. To this list, column 4 adds mean district, column 5 political process, column 6 political alternation and column 7 independent media. The rows labeled F Lobbying (or Corruption) Equation reports the p-value associated with the null hypothesis that the instruments are jointly insignificant in the first-stage regression. in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Instruments, columns 1 to 3: all above plus Parlamentary, and days lost to strikes. To this list, column 4 adds mean district, column 5 political process, column 6 ideological alternation and column 7 independent media. The rows labeled F Lobbying (or Corruption) Equation reports the p-value associated with the null hypothesis that the instruments are jointly insignificant in the first-stage regression.
